
















A legal analysis of Canadian practice in relation to ice 
























Small Master’s Thesis 
Master of Laws in the Law of the Sea 
UiT The Arctic University of Norway 











1. CHAPTER I – INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Introduction………………………………………………………………………………1 
1.1.1. Climate Change…………………………………………………………………………………..1 
1.1.2. Marine Environmental Security………………………………………………………………...2 
1.1.3. Creeping Jurisdiction…………………………………………………………………………….3 
1.2. Objective of the thesis……………………………………………………………………4 
1.3. Scope and outline of the thesis…………………………………………………………..4 
1.4. Legal sources and methodology…………………………………………………………5 
 
2. CHAPTER II – THE CANADIAN MARINE ARCTIC, THE NWP, SHIPPING AND 
ICE BREAKING 
2.1. The Canadian marine Arctic (adopted from AMSA)…………………………………6 
2.2. The Northwest Passage (NWP) (adopted from AMSA)………………………………6 
2.3. The character and scope of shipping in the Arctic…………………………………….7 




3. CHAPTER III – ASPECTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
FOR ARCTIC SHIPPING RELEVANT TO ICE BREAKING IN THE NWP 
3.1. The LOSC………………………………………………………………………………..9 
3.1.1. Balancing the rights of coastal states with the navigational rights and freedoms of other 
states……………………………………………………………………………………………………..10 
3.1.2. The contested legal status of the NWP……………………………………………………….11 
3.1.3. Article 234 of the LOSC………………………………………………………………………..13 
3.2. The IMO………………………………………………………………………………...16 





4. CHAPTER IV – CANADA’S LAWS, REGULATIONS, AND PRACTICES 
RELATED TO ICE BREAKING IN THE NWP 
4.1. Introduction……………………………………………………………………………..18 
4.2. Regulations and Guidelines for the Canadian marine Arctic………………………..19 
4.3. Arctic Shipping Pollution Prevention Regulations (ASPPR)………………………...20 
4.3.1. The Zone/Date System………………………………………………………………………….20 
4.3.2. Arctic Ice Regime Shipping System (AIRSS) Standards…………………………………..21 
4.4. When is icebreaker assistance legally required?..........................................................23 
4.4.1. Requirements under the ASPPR………………………………………………………………23 
4.4.2. Requirements under the Zone/Date System………………………………………………….25 
4.4.3. Requirements under the AIRSS Standards…………………………………………………..26 
4.5. Other features and requirements……………………………………………………...27 
4.5.1. Vessel Classes…………………………………………………………………………………...27 




5. CHAPTER V – THE CONSISTENCY OF CANADIAN PRACTICE IN RELATION 
TO ICE BREAKING (i.e. LAWS, REGULATIONS, POLICIES, ENFORCEMENT) 
WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW 
5.1. Introduction……………………………………………………………………………..34 
5.2. Comparing Canadian practice with the international regimes……………………...35 
5.2.1. Historic internal waters………………………………………………………………………..35 
5.2.2. The LOSC international straits regime………………………………………………………36 
5.2.3 The LOSC Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) regime………………………………………..37 
5.2.4. The LOSC territorial sea regime (and non-historic internal waters providing a right of 
innocent passage)………………………………………………………………………………………38 
5.3 An assessment of Canadian practice in light of Article 234…………………………..40 
5.3.1. Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………...40 
5.3.2. Foreign state immunity: the relationship between Article 234 and Article 236………..40 
5.3.3. Necessity of scientific evidence………………………………………………………………..41  
















AC   Arctic Class 
ACIA    Arctic Climate Impact Assessment  
ACS   Arctic Council System 
AIRSS   Arctic Ice Regime Shipping System 
AMSA   Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment  
AOR   Arctic Ocean Review Project 
ASPPR   Arctic Shipping Pollution Prevention Regulations  
AWPPA   Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act 
AWPPR  Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Regulations 
CAC   Canadian Arctic Category 
CCG   Canadian Coast Guard 
CDEM   Construction, Design, Equipment and Manning  
CSA    Canada Shipping Act 
DFO   Department of Fisheries and Oceans 
EEZ   Exclusive Economic Zone  
GAIRAS   Generally Accepted International Rules and Standards  
IACS International Association of Classification Societies 
ICS   International Chamber of Shipping 
IMO    International Maritime Organization 
LOSC    United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea  
NORDREG  Northern Canada Vessel Traffic Services Zone Regulations 
NSR    Northern Sea Route  
NWP    Northwest Passage  
PAME   Protection of Arctic Marine Environment  




1. CHAPTER I – INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Introduction 
The preeminent legal scholars, Rothwell and Stephens, cite climate change, marine 
environmental security and creeping jurisdiction as the three most significant challenges for 
the international law of the sea.
1
 To understand how they arrived at such a determination, one 
need simply look to the North. 
 
1.1.1. Climate Change 
Of all contemporary challenges, during the 21
st
 century the impact of climate change may 
prove to be the most significant.
2
 The impact of climate change upon the Arctic marine 
environment is expected to be significant: it has been attributed to unprecedented melting of 
sea ice in the region. The previous record for the pan-Arctic sea ice minimum extent was set 




 That record was nearly broken in September 2011, 




 In mid-September 2012, the minimum 
extent reached 3.41 million km
2
, a new pan-Arctic sea ice minimum extent.
5
 The last six 




Of importance for this paper is key finding number six of the 2004 Arctic Climate 
Impact Assessment (ACIA) Synthesis Report, entitled “Reduced Sea Ice is Very Likely to 
Increase Marine Transport and Access to Resources”.
7
 There is growing interest in new 
transportation routes that combine benefits of shorter distances, cost-effective transits and 
routes not troubled by maritime security concerns.
8
 The Northwest Passage (NWP) is 
captured by this trend, and has been open for navigation for several summers now.
9
 The NWP 
is 9,000 km shorter than the Panama Canal route and 17,000 km shorter than the Cape Horn 
route.
10
 This has contributed to a steady increase in transits through the NWP, along with 
destinational traffic associated with offshore resource activity and Arctic sea-borne tourism.
11
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1.1.2. Marine Environmental Security 
A flow on impact from climate change is that marine environmental security will become an 
even more pressing issue.
12
 The increase of shipping in the NWP does not mean that 
navigation there is comparable to other more frequently navigated routes. Sea ice will remain 
pervasive throughout Arctic winters and even ‘ice-free’ summers do not equate to effortless 
sailing through benign waters.
13
 Under certain conditions, melting ice could make shipping 
more dangerous; not less.
14
 As ice melts, the flushing or movement of ice through the 
channels and straits of the NWP could become more frequent. This ice presents a hazard to 
most vessels. 
All the actual and potential impacts of marine shipping on safety, the marine 
environment, and marine biodiversity are also relevant for Arctic marine shipping.
15
 The 
likelihood for some of these impacts to occur is higher in the NWP because of the presence of 
ice, lack of accurate charts and infrastructure, and in case of insufficient experience 
navigating in ice-covered areas.
16
 Navigation incidents resulting in damage to ships are 
likely.
17
 Because of its low temperature and circulation patterns, in the Arctic a low 
dissipation rate prevails for a pollutant such as oil.
18
 Even a few ships could threaten the 




These considerations serve to highlight the critical importance of ice breaking services 
for both current and prospective Arctic shipping. The NWP has the potential to significantly 
influence global shipping, but only if international vessels can navigate efficiently and safely. 
Given the operational environment in these regions, at present and in the foreseeable future, 
efficiency and safety is unlikely to be achieved without the successful provision, regulation, 
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1.1.3. Creeping Jurisdiction 
The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC)
20
 confirmed the 
legitimacy of the gradual encroachment by coastal states over their adjacent maritime zones.
21
 
However, there remains an ongoing capacity for coastal states to assert unilateral claims over 
some of these zones which may have considerable capacity to impact on the rights and 
interests of many states.
22
 In the NWP, there are two particular dynamics at play in this 
regard.  
The first is the ability of a coastal state to interpret the provisions of the LOSC 
unilaterally so as to gain as extensive a maritime claim as is possible.
23
 This may apply with 
respect to Canada’s drawing of straight baselines to enclose the NWP within historic internal 
waters (see below, at 3.1.2.). The assertion of this claim remains very contentious and has 
triggered protest by other states (notably, the US) which seek to protect navigational rights 
and freedoms in the area. The second is the capacity of some coastal states to adopt a 
unilateral interpretation of the LOSC so as to assert more extensive claims to sovereign rights 
or jurisdiction than was originally envisaged by the LOSC’s framers. As will be explained 
(see below, at 3.1.3.), a relevant example in respect of the NWP is the interpretation of Article 
234 of the LOSC. Although states purporting to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with 
Article 234 (here again, Canada) assert that such jurisdiction is well within that envisaged by 
the LOSC’s framers, opponents to such jurisdiction (again notably, the US) would argue 
otherwise. 
Safe and environmentally acceptable commercial navigation in the NWP requires 
rules, standards and ‘best practices’ more demanding than those applicable in marine regions 
less hazardous to navigate and possessing the appropriate infrastructure. Clearly, a high 
navigation standard is appropriate for Arctic navigation.
24
 Even with a thawing Arctic, there is 
ice variability that requires flexible icebreaker support.
25
 From a practical standpoint, ice 
breaking assistance is one of the only tools available to minimize the risk of a navigation 
incident in these transportation routes. This is the rationale behind Canadian laws, regulations 
and practice in relation to ice breaking in the NWP. However, the issues related to creeping 
jurisdiction introduced above have resulted in a complex and, at times, confused legal order 
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for the NWP.  Rather than concentrate on the vessels potentially engaged in use of the NWP, 
ensuring safer and cleaner navigation, the states with interests in the Passage have instead 
invested energy and effort debating whether or not Canada has the right to control the NWP in 
the first place. 
 
1.2. Objective of the thesis 
Set against the issues introduced above, the objective of this thesis is to discuss the following 
research questions: 
 Which aspects of the international legal framework for Arctic shipping are relevant in 
respect of ice breaking in the NWP? 
 What are the Canadian laws, regulations, and practices in relation to ice breaking in 
the NWP? 
Though significant in themselves, the two research questions above are ancillary to the main 
research question, the determination of which is the main objective of this thesis. That 
principal research question is as follows: 
 To what extent are the Canadian laws, regulations and practices in relation to ice 
breaking in the NWP consistent with international law? 
Based on findings arising from these questions, this thesis will attempt to conclude on 
adequacy of the Canadian practice in relation to ice breaking in light of the challenges for the 
NWP related to climate change, marine environmental security, and creeping jurisdiction. 
 
1.3. Scope and outline of the thesis 
This thesis consists of four parts: 
 Part 1, comprised of Chapters I and II, consists of this introduction and some 
background information. It aims to provide the reader with the context necessary to obtain a 
workable understanding of the Canadian marine Arctic, the NWP, the shipping that occurs 
therein and some basic information on ice breaking. However, spatial considerations only 
allow for minimal coverage. Possible terminology clarification and definitions are also provided.  
 Part 2, comprised of Chapter III, focuses on the first research question. Namely, it 
explores aspects of the international legal framework for Arctic shipping relevant in respect of 
ice breaking in the NWP. Again, spatial considerations do not permit an in-depth 
examination, so the author has selectively presented only those aspects deemed essential for 
the purposes of this thesis. 
5 
 
 Part 3, comprised of Chapters IV and V, focuses on the second and third research 
questions. First, Chapter IV provides a presentation of the laws, regulations and practices in 
relation to ice breaking in the NWP. From this presentation, the author establishes the 
instances in which a vessel navigating in the NWP is legally required to obtain icebreaker 
assistance. Second, Chapter V contains an analysis of the consistency of Canadian practice in 
relation to ice breaking in the NWP (presented in Chapter IV) with international law in light 
of the aspects of the international framework for Arctic shipping (presented in Chapter III). 
 Part 4, comprised of Chapter VI, attempts to conclude on the adequacy of the 
Canadian practice in relation to ice breaking in light of the challenges for the NWP related to 
climate change, marine environmental security, and creeping jurisdiction. 
 
1.4. Legal sources and methodology 
In light of the objectives of this thesis, special focus was given to pertinent international and 
national legal instruments related to Arctic shipping. Heavy emphasis was placed on the 
various Canadian legislative materials related to ice breaking in the NWP. These sources were 
analyzed using the method identified in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice.
26
 An extensive literature review of legal theory and commentary in relation to the 
relevant instruments was also employed. 
State practice received considerable attention. In this regard, the author benefitted 
greatly from personal correspondence with two key Canadian government officials directly 
involved in the regulation of shipping in the NWP and the provision of ice breaking services: 
Mr. Craig Miller, Manager, Marine Safety, Prairie and Northern Region, Transport Canada; 
and Mr. Stacy Dufour, Ice Breaking Superintendent, Central and Arctic Region, Canadian 
Coast Guard (CCG). 
An extensive literature review of legal theory and commentary was also employed. 
Where applicable, reference was made to scientific reports and policy documents related to 
the subject matter of the thesis. All sources were treated using both a descriptive and 
analytical method. In some scenarios, particularly when referring to the Russian Federation 
and the Northern Sea Route (NSR), comparative methodologies were utilized. 
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2. CHAPTER II – THE CANADIAN MARINE ARCTIC, THE NWP, SHIPPING AND 
ICE BREAKING 




The Canadian marine Arctic is located across the north of Canada from the Beaufort Sea in 
the west to Hudson Strait in the east, covering approximately 2.1 million km². The Arctic 
Archipelago comprises approximately 36,000 islands. The coastal area is sparsely populated 
with fewer than 30,000 people. The Canadian Arctic also provides important habitat for a 
range of permanent and migratory species of marine mammals, seabirds and terrestrial 
animals such as caribou. Throughout this region there are many ecologically sensitive areas 
where animals gather in large numbers at certain times and may be vulnerable to impacts from 
shipping. 
The Canadian Arctic has a long and rich history of marine use, beginning with its 
indigenous residents many thousands of years ago. Shipping in the Canadian Arctic has 
always been the safest and most economically effective means of moving goods to, from and 
within the region. It is a vast area with virtually no roads, no rail lines and where air services 
are both infrequent and very costly. There are also unique geographic and climatic conditions 
that make the region challenging for maritime navigation, including the presence of ice for 
most of the year, as well as the many narrow and shallow, often uncharted, areas through the 
archipelago. Canada has for many years strived to achieve a balance between development 
and environmental protection in its Arctic areas and for this purpose has a unique and 
extensive regulatory scheme in place to enhance marine safety and environmental protection 
in its Arctic waters. This thesis will explore the aspects of this regulatory scheme that relate to 
ice breaking in the NWP. 
 
2.2. The Northwest Passage (NWP) (adopted from AMSA)
28
 
The NWP is the name given to the various marine routes between the Atlantic and Pacific 
oceans along the northern coast of North America that span the Canadian Arctic Archipelago 
(Annex 1). All passages have common eastern and western approaches. In the east, ships must 
proceed through the Labrador Sea, Davis Strait and Baffin Bay - the exception is for Route 5, 
which requires a transit through Hudson Strait. In the western approaches ships proceed 
through the Bering Sea, Bering Strait, the Chukchi Sea and the Beaufort Sea before deciding 
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which route to follow. In general, the operating season is short - from late July to mid-October 
- depending on the route and year. Of the various passages, Routes 1 and 2 are considered 
deep water ones, while the others have limiting shoals and rocks restricting the draft of 
vessels to less than 10 meters. 
 
2.3. The character and scope of shipping in the Arctic 
Arctic shipping has been increasing as natural resource development and economic ties 
between the Arctic and the global economy expand. These are, in turn, connected with two 
trends that are expected to continue in the near future, the potential effects of global warming 
(see above, at 1.1.1.) and with development in science and technology. Greater marine access 
and potentially longer seasons of navigation are also expected with the retreat of Arctic sea 
ice.
29
 This emerging Arctic shipping is characterized by: 
 new marine systems supporting offshore hydrocarbon exploration and resource 
development; 
 expanding marine tourism;  
 summer marine transportation routes that support hard minerals and mining 
operations, and modest but growing levels of trans-Arctic cargo movement;  
 more scientific voyages in the central Arctic Ocean;  
 potential increases in fishing in coastal waters such as Baffin Bay/Davis Strait;  
 a general increase in the summer presence of a wide variety and sizes of vessels 
around the Arctic basin; and  
 other related developments.30  
Arctic shipping is understood to include a wide range of vessels from icebreakers, tankers, 
offshore support vessels, container ships, fishing vessels, bulk carriers, ferries, tug-barges and 
cruise ships, to government ships, research vessels and more. This range is consistent with the 
AMSA.
31
 Also, Arctic shipping may take different forms. AMSA identified four modes, or 
types of voyages undertaken in the marine Arctic, which will be employed for the purposes of 




While the definitions and descriptions provided above encompass all shipping occurring 
in the marine Arctic, for the most part, this thesis will only focus on shipping occurring in and 
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along the NWP. Additionally, because of the international law focus of this paper, in 
examining the laws, regulations and practices in relation to ice breaking in the NWP, greater 
attention will be given to those modes of shipping likely to be undertaken by foreign-flagged 
vessels (ie. destinational, intra-, and trans-arctic shipping). However, it should be noted that 
both foreign-flagged and domestic vessels may participate in the various modes of Arctic 
shipping occurring in the NWP, and that the ice breaking regime found therein does not 
necessarily distinguish between the various modes or the nationalities of vessels. 
 
2.4. Ice breaking – some background information 
Government and private icebreakers are an essential asset in the development of the Arctic. 
Generally, icebreakers are able to carry out the following roles: maintenance of shipping 
tracks in ice-covered waters, close escort of shipping in ice, provision of ice information, 
sovereignty support/representation, search and rescue, environmental response, command 
platform for emergency response, medical evacuation in remote areas, harbour breakout, 
electrical power supply, science platform, constabulary function (maritime security), 




For the purpose of this thesis, ice breaking means route assistance for vessels 
navigating in ice-covered waters, including: escorting ships and organizing convoys to travel 
through ice-infested waters; freeing beset vessels to allow them to proceed; maintaining 
channels and tracks in shore-fast ice to shipping; and standing by in areas where requests for 
route assistance is likely. This interpretation corresponds with the definition given to ice 
breaking in the Canadian ice navigation regime.
34
 The other aspects of ice breaking and ice 
navigation, although dealt with by Canada’s ice navigation regime, are outside the scope of 
this paper and will only be considered to the extent that they are incidental to the meaning of 
ice breaking detailed immediately above. 
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3. CHAPTER III – ASPECTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
FOR ARCTIC SHIPPING RELEVANT TO ICE BREAKING IN THE NWP 
3.1. The LOSC 
The international legal framework for Arctic shipping is a component of the 
international law of the sea, governing all uses and resources of the sea. Accompanying and 
including customary international law, the cornerstone of the international law of the sea and 
the so-called “constitution for the oceans”
35
 is the LOSC. The LOSC provides a 
comprehensive regime for the law of the sea which reaffirmed well settled areas of the law 
but also expansively developed other areas of the law and in some instances established 
completely new international law.
36
 As Canada is a party to the LOSC, its laws, regulations 
and practices in relation to ice breaking in the NWP must be consistent with the Convention.  
The LOSC applies to marine areas throughout the world, including the Arctic. As a 
matter of law, all Arctic states, including Canada, are bound to the rules contained in the 
LOSC, with the exception of the US, which is not yet a party to the Convention. However, the 
US has recognized that many parts of the LOSC, notably those relating to navigation and 
overflight, reflect customary international law, and so it too may be indirectly bound by 
relevant LOSC provisions.
37
 Reference can also be made to the Ilulissat Declaration of 2008, 
in which all five Arctic Ocean coastal states embraced the international law of the sea and its 
application to the Arctic Ocean.
38
 
It is important to recognize that both the LOSC and general international law of the 
sea are multi-dimensional. The same is true for the legal framework for shipping, Arctic or 
otherwise. This means that the framework concurrently addresses multiple subjects, such as 
marine environmental protection, maritime safety, security, and navigational rights and 
freedoms, and touches on a wide range of ocean governance challenges. However, 
navigational rights and freedoms are the interests at the core of this thesis. Although Canadian 
laws, regulations and practices in relation to ice-breaking in the NWP undoubtedly have 
impacts on the Arctic marine environment, its marine biodiversity, maritime safety, security, 
and other areas, an in-depth consideration of these impacts is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Instead, the predominant focus will be on whether or not these laws, regulations, and practices 
                                                 
35
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unjustifiably deny, hamper, impair, or suspend the navigational rights and freedoms of third 
states under the international law of the sea. 
 
3.1.1. Balancing the rights of coastal states with the navigational rights and freedoms of other 
states 
The LOSC reflects the development of customary international law relating to freedoms, 
jurisdiction and sovereignty throughout the world’s oceans. Inter alia, it sets out a carefully 
calibrated balance between the interests of coastal states on one hand, and the rights of flag 
states and the interests of the international community (to freedom of navigation and 
overflight throughout the world’s oceans), on the other - Arctic Ocean and the NWP 
included.
39
 In exchange for generous provisions preserving freedom of navigation by all 
nations, coastal states are afforded certain rights to protect their sovereignty, sovereign rights, 
authority, and jurisdiction seaward; thus affecting the legal status of the surface of the ocean 
waters, the water column, the seabed and the airspace above the water.
40
  
Accordingly, in relation to Arctic shipping in the NWP, Canada, as a coastal state, can 
prescribe laws, regulations and practices in relation to ice breaking. To be consistent with the 
LOSC, such laws, regulations and practices must be attributable to the protection of 
sovereignty and certain sovereign rights, authority, and jurisdiction, as granted by the LOSC, 
and must be compatible with the navigational rights and freedoms protected by the 
Convention. Analysis of oceans claims and jurisdictions under the LOSC begins from 
properly drawn, normal or straight baselines. Typically, the normal baseline for measuring the 
breadth of maritime zones is the low-water line along the coast of the territory.
41
 Waters 
landward of baselines are internal waters, an area in which the coastal state exercises 
complete and absolute sovereignty.
42
 
The coastal state’s maritime zones capable of directly affecting Arctic shipping are 
internal waters, territorial seas, and exclusive economic zones. However, some navigational 
rights and freedoms are preserved for all other states within these zones: In the territorial sea, 
a right of innocent passage remains;
43
 In the EEZ, freedom of navigation applies.
44
 In ice-
covered waters, these navigational rights and freedoms are subject to a special coastal state 
power to regulate international navigation for the purposes of prevention, reduction and 
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control of marine pollution from vessels (see below, at 3.1.3.).
45
 A significant legal issue is 
the extent and content of coastal state regulation of international shipping with regard to 





3.1.2. The contested legal status of the NWP 
The subject of coastal state regulation of international shipping within the NWP is complex 
because the legal status of large areas of water in Canadian Arctic areas, where the emerging 
trade route is found, is contested. Canada claims the waters are enclosed by straight baselines 
and that they are historic internal waters.
47
 This would make the route subject to national 
sovereignty, effectively placing those areas beyond any right of international navigation. 
However, some states (notably, the US), claim that this route includes straits used for 
international navigation and that, as a result, those straits are subject to the international 
regime of transit passage.
48
  
The latter characterization potentially constrains the coastal state in regulating 
international navigation,
49
 including prescribing and enforcing laws, regulations, and practices 
in relation to ice breaking in the NWP. For example, transit passage (unlike innocent passage) 
may not be suspended.
50
 This rule may call into question laws which prohibit international 
vessels from navigating in parts of the NWP without ice breaker assistance. Also, if those 
waters are not internal, coastal States are constrained in the types of fees they can levy on 
international ships, as only fees for service rendered can be levied, and not merely for 
passage.
51
 Issues may arise if it is unclear how a particular fee is structured or which services 
it relates to. This may be the case in the Russian Federation’s NSR, where ice-strengthened 
vessels which may not require ice breaker assistance are nonetheless required to pay a fee to 
transit the route. While not yet an issue in the NWP, it may become one if Canada implements 
a user-pays approach in the NWP in the future. Further, strait states (here, Canada), and user 
states can be expected to cooperate on navigation and safety aids in straits subject to transit 
passage.
52
 This aspect of the transit passage regime has proven to be very difficult to 
implement in practice in other international straits, such as the Strait of Malacca, where strait 
                                                 
45
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states and user states disagree on the content of their obligations, and more specifically, the 
apportionment of costs among parties.
53
 
 The purpose of this thesis is not to analyze in-depth the legitimacy of the various 
competing claims surrounding the legal status of the NWP, or whether or not the transit 
passage regime applies to the area. Countless leading scholars have already discussed the 
complex legal arguments supporting the Canadian position as well as opposing views. Rather, 
irrespective of the outcome of the legal debate regarding the specific status of the NWP, the 
aim is to focus on the laws, regulations and practices in relation to ice breaking prescribed by 
Canada for foreign vessels navigating in those routes. Indeed, whether Canada is successful in 
asserting absolute sovereignty over Arctic waters as their internal waters, or whether a right of 
transit passage is found to exist through the NWP as a recognized international strait (or, in 
the alternative, a right of innocent passage on the basis that Canadian straight baselines are 
not consistent with the LOSC and the historic waters claim is dismissed), Canada, as a coastal 
state or strait state, is nonetheless attributed important powers and prerogatives. These powers 
mean that, like it or not, user states and strait states will have to co-operate if Arctic shipping 
is hoped to develop in the NWP. As Chircop explains: 
It is not realistic to expect […] Canada […] to withdraw from their positions 
on the legal status of those waters. The more likely scenario is for States to 
continue to agree to disagree and for the Arctic States in question to develop 
practical frameworks and arrangements to facilitate international navigation 
through those waters to promote development of their northern regions.
54
 
While not mentioned above, the 1988 Arctic Cooperation Agreement
55
 is an example 
of an agreement to disagree currently in practice in the NWP. It demonstrates the capacity and 
willingness by Canada and the US to overlook legal disputes and collaborate in functional 
terms. Canada respects US icebreaker traffic through the NWP while both states maintain 
their position on the legal status of the passage.
56
 As will be explored in the following 
chapters, the need for practicality often takes precedence over conflicting legal positions in 
the Arctic; there seems to be a silent understanding among current NWP users that Canadian 
laws, regulations and practice in relation to ice breaking assist safe and efficient international 
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3.1.3. Article 234 of the LOSC 
Article 234 of the LOSC, a provision negotiated mostly between Canada, the US and the 
former Soviet Union,
57
 provides another dimension to coastal state regulation of international 
shipping in the Arctic. Under Article 234, coastal states enjoy jurisdiction to regulate 
international navigation within their ice-covered EEZs that goes beyond coastal state 
jurisdiction found in any other marine region.
58
 Generally, prescriptive jurisdiction by coastal 
states cannot be more stringent than the level of ‘generally accepted international rules and 
standards’ (GAIRAS).
59
 These refer to the technical rules and standards laid down in 
instruments adopted by regulatory bodies, in particular, the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO - the competent international organisation for the establishment of 
international rules and standards for maritime safety, security, and marine environmental 
protection from shipping). It is likely that the rules and standards laid down in legally binding 
IMO instruments that have entered into force can be regarded as GAIRAS.
60
 However, since 
Article 234 makes no reference to GAIRAS or any competent international organization,
61
 
coastal states are in a position to adopt higher standards for international navigation in ice-
covered waters than those generally adopted through the IMO and without the requirement to 
do so through that organization.
62
 
 Certain conditions must be satisfied in order to exercise jurisdiction under Article 234 
and the rule is accompanied by possible uncertainties. First, it is only applicable to areas 
“where particularly severe climatic conditions and the presence of ice covering such areas for 
most of the year create obstructions or exceptional hazards to navigation”.
63
 Although the 
extent of sea ice in the NWP is decreasing (or altogether vanishing) in summer months, the 
longer winter season still keeps the route ice covered for most of the year, so it is anticipated 
that Canada can exercise Article 234 powers all year round in those areas. Second, there must 
be a risk of “major harm to or irreversible disturbance of the ecological balance”,
64
 which in 
the NWP is satisfied by the fragile Arctic environment, where, ie., the ability to address spills 
is limited, either because of the presence of ice or because a spill occurs in a remote area 
where timely response is not possible (see above, at 1.1.2.). Third, Article 234 refers to 
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jurisdiction to be exercised “within the limits of the exclusive economic zone”.
65
 It is not clear 
whether the scope of the article is also intended to include the territorial sea, but it is 
submitted that the provision should be interpreted as indicating the outer limits of the EEZ as 
the extent of such scope, but not to exclude the territorial sea.
66
 Fourth, the laws and 
regulations to be adopted pursuant to Article 234 must be “non-discriminatory… [and] have 
due regard to navigation… based on the best scientific evidence”.
67
 All conditions must be 
met and adopted rules cannot be arbitrary as otherwise they may be challenged. This 
requirement is particularly relevant to this thesis and should be kept in mind. Fifth, and linked 
to the requirement of best scientific evidence, laws and regulations adopted pursuant to 
Article 234 must be for the purpose of regulation of vessel-source pollution. An issue is 
whether Article 234 provides merely an extended pollution jurisdiction in the NWP or 
whether such jurisdiction can also include safety regulation.
68
 In order for Canadian laws, 
regulations, and practices in relation to ice breaking in the NWP to be a valid exercise of 
jurisdiction under Article 234, they must be linked to regulation of vessel-source pollution.  
In some instances the safety and pollution jurisdictions are intertwined, especially in 
the Arctic, but there can be safety matters that are unrelated to pollution, such as rules 
regarding life saving equipment.
69
 As already mentioned, rules related to navigation and 
safety that lack an environmental purpose fall squarely within the auspices of the IMO, and 
unless adopted in cooperation with that organization, a coastal state could not impose rules on 
international shipping cooperation that go beyond GAIRAS.
70
 Therefore, if Article 234 is 
interpreted restrictively for environmental purposes, Arctic coastal states need to find a 
complementary balance between domestic environmental regulation and maritime safety 
regulation through the IMO.
71
 Canada has learned this the hard way in the context of 
Canada’s 2010 Northern Canada Vessel Services Zone Regulations (NORDREG),
72
 which 
established mandatory reporting requirements for vessels of 300 gross tonnage or more, 
vessels engaged in towing and vessels carrying pollutants or dangerous goods entering or 
leaving Canadian Arctic waters.
73
 The US has objected to the NORDREG regulations, 
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questioning their consistency with international law, stating that the regulations, among other 
things:  
 infringe the freedom of navigation within the EEZ and the right of innocent passage in 
the territorial sea;  
 do not meet the Article 234 obligation “having regard to navigation”;  
 have a disputed scientific basis (as they claim the areas in question are not necessarily 
ice-covered for most of the year); and  
 at a minimum, need to be proposed and adopted at the IMO, as the US holds the view 
that the NWP constitutes a strait used for international navigation,.
74
 
At the outset of this paper (see above, at 1.1.2.), a description was provided of the harsh 
and dangerous operational environment in the NWP, where a high likelihood of marine 
incidents exists even in relatively ice-free summer months. The extreme fragility and 
vulnerability of the Arctic marine environment has also been described (see above, at 1.1.2.). 
It is the author’s view that the combination of these two factors suggests that allowing non-
ice-strengthened vessels to navigate freely without ice breaker assistance is an accident (and 
an environmental disaster) waiting to happen. As such, the author submits that laws and 
regulations related to ice breaking requirements for international ships may be considered 
consistent with the environmental protection purpose of Article 234. Such a conclusion alone 
will not protect Canadian laws, regulations and practice in relation to ice breaking from 
challenge. That will always depend on a specific analysis of such jurisdiction. As will be 
explained (see below, at 4.5.4.), Canada has linked its laws, regulations and practices in 
relation to ice breaking in the NWP with the NORDREG regulations. As such, the continuing 
debate surrounding NORDREG regulations may have an impact on Canada’s ice breaking 
practice and policy, even if such practice and policy is consistent with international law when 
considered alone. This will also be explored (see below, at 4.5.4.). 
 Finally, the LOSC does not explicitly address the scenario of water that are both ice-
covered and subject to the regime of transit passage, as the case may be if the NWP is 
considered to be, wholly or partly, straits used for international navigation.
75
 However, many 
commentators argue (and the author tends to agree) that the stand-alone Article 234 in the 
separate Section 8 of Part XII supports the dominance of Article 234 over transit passage.
76
 
The International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) and (possibly) the US support the opposite 











 For the time being such discussion may remain purely academic, because, as stated 
earlier in this chapter (see above, at 3.1.2.), Canada and its rival claimants do not seem willing 
to give up their various positions on the status of the NWP, and seem to prefer a cooperative 




3.2. The IMO  
Some comments have already been made regarding IMO’s role in developing GAIRAS and 
the implications this may have for Canadian laws, regulations and practices in relation to ice 
breaking in the NWP (see 3.1.3., above).  There are many IMO instruments relevant to Arctic 
shipping, containing various obligations and measures that can be broadly categorized as (a) 
discharge and emission standards, (b) construction, design, equipment and manning (CDEM) 




There are several instruments related to the construction standards of vessels operating 
in the polar regions, developed and adopted with the auspices of the IMO (see below, at 
4.5.1.). However, none of these IMO instruments contain standards or measures directly 
related to ice breaking. This is significant, as it means that, in the case of ice breaking, the 
IMO, typically the competent international organization for matters related to shipping, may 
not directly contribute to the formation or adoption of GAIRAS in this regard.  
Of course, as already discussed (see above, at 3.1.3), the issue of GAIRAS and the 
IMO can be avoided altogether if Canada justifies laws and regulations in relation to ice 
breaking as a valid exercise of jurisdiction under Article 234 of the LOSC. This appears to be 





3.3. The Arctic Council and other regional instruments 
The Arctic Council is a high-level forum established by means of the 1996 Ottawa 
Declaration.
81
 This non-legally binding instrument indicates it is not an international 
organization and implies that it cannot adopt legally binding decisions or instruments. 
Nonetheless, the mandate of the Arctic Council is very broad and relates to “common Arctic 
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issues” with special reference to “issues of sustainable development and environmental 
protection in the Arctic”.
82
 Marine shipping falls squarely within this broad mandate and the 
Arctic Council has produced output that relates specifically to marine shipping as well as less 
specific or more indirectly relevant output.
83
 Further, Molenaar has introduced the concept of 
the Arctic Council System (ACS) to clarify that legally binding instruments such as the 
Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic 
(Arctic SAR Agreement)
84
 and the Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution 
Preparedness and Response in the Arctic (Arctic MOPPR Agreement)
85
, and their institutional 
components, can be part of the Council’s output even though they are not (and in fact could 
not be) formally adopted by it.
86
  
 Similar to the discussion on IMO instruments and ice breaking (see above, at 3.2), 
there is no legally binding instrument from the Arctic Council directly related to measures and 
standards regarding ice breaking in the Arctic. Theoretically, it could be possible for the 
Arctic Council to support work on a legally binding instrument in respect of laws, regulations 
and practice in relation to ice breaking in the NWP which could impact Canadian jurisdiction. 
However, as this has not yet materialized, it will not be explored further in this paper. 
 The above does not mean that the Arctic Council is not relevant to ice breaking 
practice and policy in the Arctic. First, it remains the primary political forum for cooperation 
on such matters in the Arctic region. Canada has recently assumed the Chair of the Arctic 
Council and may be reasonably expected to use this position in the forum to advance existing 
and future laws, regulations and practices in relation to ice breaking in the NWP. Second, the 
Council has produced important output for Arctic marine shipping, such as the Arctic Marine 
Shipping Assessment (AMSA) and the recent Arctic Ocean Review (AOR), both of which 
contain recommendations that touch on ice breaking practice and policy. A number of these 
recommendations have been implemented by the Arctic states or have supported negotiations 
of new instruments.
87
 In future, such output could provide the political impetus for regional 
instruments related to ice breaking standards and measures in the NWP.  
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4. CHAPTER IV – CANADA’S LAWS, REGULATIONS, AND PRACTICES 
RELATED TO ICE BREAKING IN THE NWP 
4.1. Introduction 
As presented earlier (see above, at 2.2, 3.1.2.), the NWP lies within the centre of the Canadian 
Arctic Archipelago. It is claimed by Canada to be internal waters, over which Canada 
exercises full sovereignty. Regulatory control, in accordance with this sovereignty, involves 
several Canadian government institutions sharing different responsibilities. The regulation of 
shipping in the NWP is overseen by Transport Canada, a department of the Canadian federal 
government. However, the actual provision of ice breaking services is conducted by the 
Canadian Coast Guard (CCG), a special agency of the Government of Canada’s Department 
of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO).
88
 The CCG owns and operates the federal government’s 
civilian fleet and provides key maritime services for the use and development of Canada’s 
maritime zones in three oceans and its internal waterways.  
Under the authority of the Oceans Act,
89
 the CCG provides ice breaking and ice 
management services to support the movement of ships in Canadian maritime zones. The 
presence of a viable, guaranteed ice breaking service is one of the most important factors in 
sustaining the Canadian Arctic economy and communities, not only because maritime 
shipping is the most economical method of transporting large amounts of goods, but also from 
the perspective of linking these communities to the rest of Canada.
90
 However, for the time 
being, the availability of these services in the Arctic is limited solely to the summer 
navigation season.
91
 This not only reflects the reality of current shipping in the NWP, but also 
the limited capability of the CCG’s ice breaking fleet. In the winter months, all CCG 
icebreakers are occupied with icebreaking and ice management services in the southern 
Canadian waterways, namely maintaining established shipping routes in the St. Lawrence 
Seaway, the Gulf of St. Lawrence and the waters surrounding the Atlantic provinces of 
Canada. In addition, none of the CCG icebreakers are sufficiently ice-strengthened or 
powerful enough for Arctic winter sea ice.
92
 For the foreseeable future, there are no plans to 
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4.2. Regulations and Guidelines for the Canadian marine Arctic 
Arctic shipping in Canada is governed by several pieces of legislation. Principally these are 
the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act (AWPPA) and its regulations,
94
 the Canada 
Shipping Act 2001 (CSA),
95
 the Marine Liability Act,
96
 the Marine Transportation Security 
Act,
97
 the Coasting Trade Act
98
 and the Canada Labour Code.
99
 It is beyond the scope of this 
paper to analyze this entire body of legislation. For the purpose of examining Canada’s laws 
and regulations in relation to ice breaking in the NWP, the AWPPA and its regulations are of 
most relevance.  
Through the AWPPA, ‘Marine Safety’, a branch of Transport Canada, is responsible for 
ensuring navigation in the NWP preserves and protects the sensitive northern ecosystem. 
Under the AWPPA there are several regulations that affect vessel navigation in the Arctic. 
The following are among the more important regulations: 
 Arctic Shipping Pollution Prevention Regulations (ASPPR);100 
 Shipping Safety Control Zones Order;101 
 Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Regulations (AWPPR);102 
 Navigation Safety Regulations; 103 
 Ship Station (Radio) Regulations;104 
 Charts and Nautical Publications Regulations, 1995;105 
The AWPPA and its AWPPR provide measures to prevent pollution from ships, and in 
particular, the deposit of waste into Arctic waters.
106
 The AWPPA’s ASPPR deal with 
construction and operational aspects of navigating in the Arctic, including the need for Ice 
Navigators.
107
 The ASPPR also contains the Zone/Date System, which is a system dividing 
the Arctic into 16 Shipping Safety Control Zones, each with fixed opening and closing dates 
for ships of various ice capabilities.
108
 The Arctic Ice Regime Shipping System (AIRSS)
109
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was introduced as a more flexible system that uses the actual ice conditions to determine 
whether entry is allowed in an ice regime.
110
 The Zone/Date System and the AIRSS operate in 
parallel to one another (see below, at 4.3.1., 4.3.2.). 
 
4.3. Arctic Shipping Pollution Prevention Regulations (ASPPR) 
As stated, the ASPPR mainly governs construction and operational aspects of navigating in 
the Arctic, including the need for Ice Navigators and Arctic Pollution Prevention 
Certificates.
111
 Depending on the size of a ship, its cargo, its construction standards, the zone 
in which it seeks to navigate and the date of such intended navigation, the ship will be subject 
to either the Zone/Date System, the AIRSS, or, if neither of those systems applies, the 
remaining general provisions of the ASPPR. In general, the ASPPR only apply to a ship of 
100 gross tons or more, however sections 28 to 30 (referring to sewage and oil deposits) apply 
to every ship.
112
 The Zone/Date System has a narrower application, applying to ships of 100 




 The AIRRS also 
applies to all ships of 100 gross tons or more and carrying oil in a quantity in excess of 
453m
3
, but is only applicable outside of the fixed opening and closing dates for ships of 
various ice capabilities under the Zone/Date System (see below, at 4.3.1., 4.3.2.). 
 
4.3.1. The Zone/Date System 
The ASPPR introduces the Zone/Date System in which the Arctic waters are divided into 
sixteen Shipping Safety Control Zones, with a schedule of earliest and latest entry dates for 
each zone corresponding to specific categories of vessels.
114
 Zone 1 has the most severe ice 
conditions and Zone 16 the least.
115
 Annex 3 contains a map of the Canadian Arctic 
illustrating the sixteen Shipping Safety Control Zones (excerpt from Schedule II of the 
Shipping Safety Control Zones Order). The map is designed to be used with the Dates of 
Entry table from Schedule VIII of the ASPPR.
116
 Schedule V of the ASPPR provides a 
comparison of various classification societies’ Ice Strengthening Class or open-water 
designation for Types A, B, C, D and E Ships to assist with the use of the Zone/Date System. 
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Using the table in Schedule VIII of the AWPPA, an operator can determine the legal periods 
of entry into the various Zones.
117
 AIRSS is currently used only when making access 
decisions outside of these established dates.
118
 
Under the ASPPR, no ship carrying more than 453m
3 
of oil shall navigate in any of the 
zones illustrated unless the ship itself meets prescribed construction standards as either a 
Polar Class ship, Arctic Class (AC) ship, a Canadian Arctic Category (CAC) ship or a Type 
A, B, C, D or E ship.
119
 The Type E designation refers to an open-water ship.
120
 Again, for 
those ships carrying less than the 453m
3
 of oil, the Zone/Date System does not apply, 
however, the remainder of the ASPPR regulations still do.
121
 For newly constructed ships, it is 
now recommended that vessels are built to standards based upon Polar Classes (PC) set out in 
the IACS Unified Requirements for Polar Ships.
122
 Owners of ships built to polar standards of 
other Classification Societies and national authorities can apply for PC equivalency on a case-
by-case basis, as may owners of vessels previously classified under the existing Canadian 
system for AC or CAC vessels.
123
 More information is provided below (at 4.5.1.). 
 
4.3.2. Arctic Ice Regime Shipping System (AIRSS) Standards 
Referenced in the ASPPR, the AIRSS standards were developed to enhance the safety and 
efficiency of shipping operations in the Canadian Arctic.
124
 The standards characterize the 
relative risk which different ice conditions pose to the structure of different ships.
125
 
While the Zone/Date System is based on rigid controls, the AIRSS emphasizes the 
responsibility of the master for the safety of the ship.
126
 This provides a more flexible 
framework to assist in decision-making. Both systems are presently working in parallel, 
allowing operators to navigate outside the Zone/Date limits when ice conditions permit. 
Operators are able to use the Zone/Date scheme to generally plan voyages in the Arctic while 
being encouraged to avoid dangerous ice conditions through the use of the AIRSS. The 
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The AIRSS is based on the concept that ice conditions can be quantified through a 
arithmetic Ice Numeral calculation which indicates whether or not a given set of ice 
conditions (regimes) will be safe for a particular vessel. A wide range of ice navigation 
parameters including visibility, vessel speed and manoeuvrability, the availability of an 




The AIRSS is a four-step process.
129
 First, the user vessel characterizes the ice regime. 
The ice regime is a region of ice with more or less consistent ice conditions. The ice regime 
takes into account several important factors of the ice; its concentration, thickness, age, state 
of decay, and roughness. 
Second, the vessel’s class-dependant Ice Multipliers are obtained. Because different 
vessels have different capabilities in ice-covered waters, each vessel is assessed and assigned 
to a vessel class. This rating reflects the strength, displacement, and power of the vessel (see 
below, at 4.5.1.). The relative risk of damage to a vessel by different types of ice is taken into 
account using “weighting” factors called Ice Multipliers. 
Third, the information about the ice regime and the Ice Multipliers is combined to 
determine the Ice Numeral. (The Ice Numeral is a calculation that relates the strength of the 
ship to the danger presented by different ice regimes.) 
Finally, the Ice Numeral is used to decide whether the vessel should proceed or take an 
alternative route. Ice regimes that are not likely to be hazardous have zero or ‘positive’ Ice 
Numerals; whereas, those regimes that could be dangerous have ‘negative’ Ice Numerals. As 
always, the safety of the ship ultimately remains the responsibility of the master. 
Intentional entry into a negative ice regime outside the Zone/Date System is prohibited.
130
 
The master may consider taking one of the following actions:
131
 
 Selecting another route; 
 Obtaining more recent and/or higher quality ice information; 
 Waiting for improved weather or ice conditions; 
 Requesting the assistance of an icebreaker through NORDREG. 
When entry is permitted, mariners should select an operating speed that will allow them to 
avoid damage from ice.
132
 When AIRSS is used for voyages outside of the existing Zone/Date 
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System, there is a requirement for ships to submit an Ice Regime Routing Message and 
the After Action Report through NORDREG.
133
 
  The above is only a brief summary of the regulatory regime for shipping in the NWP. 
Spatial constraints do not allow for a detailed account of the Zone/Date System and AIRSS 
and their complex components. While at face value these regulations may appear onerous and 
daunting, they offer a fair degree of flexibility for vessels seeking to navigate the NWP, at 
least when it comes to ice breaking requirements. 
 
4.4. When is icebreaker assistance legally required? 
4.4.1. Requirements under the ASPPR 
Recall that, under the ASPPR, different (but parallel) systems govern operational aspects of a 
vessel’s navigation depending on the size of a ship, its cargo, its construction standards, the 
zone in which it seeks to navigate and the date of such intended navigation (see above, at 
4.3.). Namely, these are the Zone/Date System, the AIRSS, or, if neither of those systems 
applies, the remaining general provisions of the ASPPR. Accordingly, the system that applies 
to a particular vessel determines whether or not requirements exist for icebreaker assistance. 
 There are different requirements for icebreaker assistance (or a lack thereof) under the 
Zone/Date System and the AIRSS. These are described below (at 4.4.2, 4.4.3.). However, 
apart from these systems, the ASPPR itself contains a requirement for icebreaker assistance. 
Section 6(4) of the ASPPR provides: 
(4) No Type B ship carrying oil in a quantity in excess of 453 m
3
 shall navigate in 
Zone 6 during the period commencing on August 1 and terminating on August 24 in 
any year unless 
(a) an icebreaker available for escort duties is located in or in the vicinity of Zone 6; 
and 
(b) where the ship carries oil as cargo, it is escorted by an icebreaker that has on board 




At the time of writing, this is the only provision found in any of the relevant Canadian laws, 
regulations related to Arctic shipping where a requirement to obtain icebreaker assistance is 
expressly provided for and still in force. As will be discussed (see below, at 4.4.2., 4.4.3), 
there are no such requirements under the Zone/Date System, and, although a requirement may 
arise under the AIRSS, it does so indirectly on a case-by-case basis which considers a wide 
range of factors.  
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The rationale behind Section 6(4) of the ASPPR is not entirely clear. The requirement 
for icebreaker assistance in the provision appears to be based on a vessel’s construction, its 
cargo, an intention to navigate in Zone 6 and the date such navigation is intended to take 
place. While the provision’s application to vessels carrying relatively large amounts of oil as 
cargo is reasonably understood from a pollution prevention standpoint, the same cannot be 
said about the decision to single out only Type B ships from the several other classes that may 
operate in the NWP, especially Type C, D and E vessels, which generally have lesser ice 
capability. Further uncertainty arises from the fact that the requirement for icebreaker 
assistance in the provision only arises in Zone 6. Earlier (see above, at 4.3.1.) it was explained 
that the NWP and surrounding Arctic waters were divided into 16 zones based on their ice 
conditions. Zone 1 typically has the most severe ice conditions and Zone 16 has the least. By 
these standards, Zone 6 can be expected to have moderate to severe ice conditions, but 
certainly not the most severe when compared to Zones 1-5. Therefore, it is unclear why Zone 
6 is the only zone where vessels meeting the other criteria of the provision in question are 
required to obtain icebreaker assistance. It is also puzzling to consider the dates during which 
the requirement applies: From 1 August to 24 August of any year. Considering the summer 
navigation season in the Canadian Arctic generally runs from June to November, and that 
Arctic sea ice reaches its minimum extent in September (the sea ice would already be well on 
its decline in August), the significance of the dates chosen warrants scrutiny. An increased 
need for ice breaking during the relevant dates is not an obvious justification for the 
requirement found in Section 6(4). 
The author submits that other factors than those immediately apparent must have 
combined to influence Section 6(4)’s peculiar criteria in this regard, such as Zone 6’s central 
location in the region (see map in Annex 3), or the historical volume of Type B vessel traffic 
carrying oil in the area during the provision’s relevant dates. In personal communications with 
Transport Canada’s Manager of Marine Safety, Prairie and Northern Region, the author was 
informed that many of the ASPPR’s provisions were based on specific but limited economic 
projects or activities that were taking place or foreseeable at the time the regulations were first 
adopted. Within the ASPPR, environmental issues specific to these projects seem to be 
addressed by provisions with a rather particular scope of application prescribing certain 
operational requirements for ships. Many of these projects or activities have reached 
completion or were discontinued some years ago, and as such, the provisions are no longer 
relevant, have been repealed or no longer reflect the present reality. Reference can be made to 
Section 6 (7) of the ASPPR, which provides: 
25 
 
(7) From the day on which this subsection comes into force to December 31, 2001, no 
Arctic class 3 ship carrying oil in a quantity in excess of 453 m
3
 shall navigate in that 
part of zone 1 that consists of the southern approaches through the Byam Martin 
Channel or Erskine Inlet to Cameron Island during the periods beginning on August 1 
and ending on August 14 and beginning on September 16 and ending on September 
30, unless [...] (emphasis added by author) 
The navigation restrictions found in Section 6(7) no longer apply because the provision itself 
included a date for the expiration of its application which has since lapsed. It seems apparent 
that the restrictions contained in the above provision were drafted to accomplish a specific 
purpose or objective that would be no longer necessary after expiration of a certain date. 
Without obtaining specific information on the subject, the author must assume the 
requirement for icebreaker assistance found in Section 6(4) is also based on specific, 
calculated needs. This is an important factor in the legal validity of the restrictions under 
international law and will be explored in the following chapter. 
 
4.4.2. Requirements under the Zone/Date System 
As outlined above (see 4.3.1.), under the Zone/Date System a vessel’s right to navigate in a 
particular area is based strictly on the class of the vessel, the zone in which it seeks to 
navigate, and the corresponding range of dates navigation in that zone is permitted based on 
the first two criteria. If such vessel is of sufficient class for the particular zone and date, it 
may navigate in that zone freely, with no requirement to obtain icebreaker assistance. 
However, if the vessel does not satisfy the zone and date criteria, under the Zone/Date system 
the vessel is not permitted to navigate in the area and obtaining ice breaking services provides 
no remedy to the situation. Even if icebreaker assistance could be acquired, the vessel is 
nonetheless prohibited from navigating in such a zone. The potential or actual acquisition of 
ice breaking services is given no weight in the Zone/Date System’s operation. Therefore, it 
can be said that the Zone/Date system entails no requirement for ice breaking assistance. 
It is evident that such a system alone is inadequate. The fixed limits of the Zone/Date 
System are largely incompatible with the highly variable Arctic sea ice and the volatile 
operational environment found in the NWP.
135
  The Zone/Date System also fails to reflect the 
present reality in the NWP brought on by climate change. The veracity of the Zone/Date 
System has been investigated by Transport Canada. They found that:  
…there are very large variations in the ice conditions from year-to-year. An 
examination of several years of data has shown that the Zone-Date System allows 
vessels into ice regimes which have a high potential to damage the vessel and it often 
restricts vessels from entering regions where the ice conditions are favourable for a 
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safe passage. The large annual variations are not taken into account by this system - it 
has fixed (rigid) entry dates that often do not reflect the severity of the ice.
136
 
In the Zone/Date System, regardless of which regime is applied to the NWP – internal waters, 
transit passage, innocent passage, freedom of navigation subject to jurisdiction under Article 
234, or any combination thereof– there is a significant risk of an unacceptable outcome both 
for Canada and ships navigating in the area. Legal issues surrounding these outcomes are 
discussed in the following chapter (see below, at 5.3.3.). Canada’s apparent recognition of the 
Zone/Date’s weakness is demonstrated by the adoption of the parallel AIRSS standards. 
 
4.4.3. Requirements under the AIRSS Standards 
As mentioned, the AIRSS works in parallel to the Zone/Date System. Again, under the current 
regulatory framework, the AIRSS applies to any ship 100 gross tons or more and carrying oil 
in a quantity of excess of 453m
3
, outside of the fixed opening and closing dates for ships of 
various ice capabilities under the Zone/Date System. However, unlike the Zone/Date System, 
the AIRSS can require a vessel to obtain ice breaking assistance in some scenarios.  
Referring to the fourth step of the AIRSS process (described above, at 4.3.2.), if a ship 
conducts the required calculations for a particular ice regime, and the resulting Ice Numeral is 
negative, the ship is not allowed to proceed along its elected course through that ice regime. 
Unless the ship selects another route or waits for the ice conditions to improve, the only way 
the ship can continue along its elected route is to acquire ice breaking assistance, so as to alter 
the relevant ice regime in hopes of producing a positive Ice Numeral along the ship’s 
course
137
. Ships requesting icebreaker assistance must send an official request via the 
NORDREG reporting system.
138
 The request is relayed to the CCG ice breaking 
superintendent to be assessed.
139
 If mandated by assessment, an icebreaker is then deployed 
and can usually meet the ship within 24 hours.
140
 
Importantly, the assisting icebreaker itself must be able to produce a positive Ice 
Numeral along the requesting ship’s course through the relevant ice regime in order to comply 
with the AIRSS.
141
 CCG icebreakers are not subject to the Zone/Date System or the AIRSS, 
but the mere presence of an icebreaker is not enough to secure entry into an ice regime.
142
 
Recall that under the AIRSS, a ship must always encounter a positive Ice Numeral along its 
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route if it wishes to continue.
143
 As an icebreaker breaks up the ice regime and frees a path, a 
positive Ice Numeral is usually created ahead of the requesting ship, but this may not always 
be the case.
144
 In the scenario where ice breaking assistance cannot achieve a positive Ice 
Numeral, intentional entry by a ship into the negative ice regime remains prohibited.
145
 This is 
also the case if ice breaking assistance cannot be obtained.
146
  
While the scientific basis for restrictions on the navigation of vessels is improved 
under AIRSS, like the Zone/Date System, the AIRSS scientific veracity has been inspected 
and led to a recommendation that the system should be modified.
147
 This may affect the status 
of the system under international law. A discussion of possible legal issues surrounding the 
AIRSS requirements is found in the following chapter (see below, at 5.3.3.). 
 
4.5. Other features and requirements 
4.5.1. Vessel Classes 
Ice strengthening appropriate for the conditions encountered is fundamental to safe operation 
in ice. Ice classes indicating capability in ice have been established by many organizations. 
Currently, the ice breaking regulations and standards discussed above are based on a mix of 
unique Canadian Arctic Categories (AC & CAC), and Types that are based on the Finnish-
Swedish (Baltic) Rules. Vessels designed to any other ice class are only considered for 
equivalency on a case-by-case basis. However, since the adoption of these regulations and 
standards, the IACS Unified Requirements (URs) for Polar Class Ships (UR I1, I2 and I3)
148
 
took effect. The URs were connected to an agreement that IMO would develop overall 
guidelines for ships operating in ice-covered waters. The result was the IMO Guidelines for 
Ships Operating in Arctic Ice-covered Waters,
149
 in December 2002. It was also agreed that 
details of hull and machinery construction would be coordinated through IACS, and the (then 
draft) URs are referenced in the IMO Guidelines. The AC, CAC and Type classes utilized by 
the ASPPR and its systems are not consistent with the URs. 
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The Guidelines and URs both utilize seven Polar Classes - PC 1 through PC 7 (see 
Annex 2).
150
 PC 1 is the most capable class, capable of year-round operation in all ice 
conditions. PC 6/7 are for use in summer/autumn operations in medium/thin first-year ice, 
which may include old ice inclusions.
151
 The lowest classes, PC 6 and PC 7, can be 
considered as ‘polarized’ versions of the top two Baltic classes and the top classes represent 
levels of capability that have not yet been provided by commercial cargo-carrying vessels.
152
 
The IMO Polar Shipping Guidelines,
153
 adopted in 2009, update the above-mentioned 
Guidelines and extend their application to Antarctic waters in the ongoing work towards the 
development of an international code of safety for ships operating in polar waters (the Polar 
Code). 
These international efforts to harmonize classifications and standards for Arctic 
vessels are not presently taken into account in the current Canadian regulations. However 
Transport Canada has indicated its intent to do so, indicating that it will work towards 
revising the ASPPR and other regulations and standards to reflect the new classifications.
154
 
As an interim measure, new ships built to these URs will be assigned a PC notation ranging 
from PC1 to PC7.
155
 A PC notation may also be assigned to an existing vessel by applying to 
an IACS-recognised classification to have the vessel assessed in accordance with the URs for 
PC ships.156 Nonetheless, the lack of harmonization between the Canadian laws and 
regulations and global standards, like the IACS URs and IMO Polar Guidelines, could be 
perceived as a weakness in the regime related to ice breaking in the NWP. This will be 
explored in the following chapter (see below, at 5.3.4.) 
 
4.5.2. Reporting requirements and NORDREG 
Specific to the purposes of this thesis, ships should contact the following relevant government 
organizations prior to an Arctic voyage: 
1) Marine Safety, Transport Canada, Prairie and Northern Region – Marine Safety has 
up-to-date information relating to marine regulations applicable to ships operating in 
the region and is responsible for all vessel approval. The ship are encouraged to have a 
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general vessel itinerary that determines whether it falls within legal entry limits for the 
various Shipping Safety Control Zones.
157
 
2) The CCG, Central & Arctic Region - ships are encouraged to provide the CCG with 
an itinerary early in the planning process. The CCG uses this information in 
combination with other submissions in the spring to plan the deployment of their 
icebreaking resources for the upcoming season.
158
 
 In addition to these general reporting requirements, which are largely non-mandatory, 
there are more specific, mandatory requirements associated with Canada’s NORDREG 
regulations (see above, at 3.1.3.). The  NORDREG regulations apply to every ship of 300 
tonnes gross tonnage or more; to vessels engaged in towing or pushing another vessel if the 
combined tonnage of 500 tonnes or more; to vessel that are carrying as cargo, a pollutant or 
dangerous goods or towing or pushing a vessel that is carrying pollutant or dangerous 
goods.
159
 NORDREG is a mandatory vessel traffic services system that also provides mariners 
with information pertaining to ice conditions, vessel routing, icebreaker assistance and other 
government services.
160
 Mariners may obtain ice information and access shipping support 
services by sending a message through NORDREG, and are in fact required to do so in order 
to obtain ice breaking assistance under the ASPPR and AIRSS. 
 The disputed validity of the NORDREG regulations was also introduced earlier in this 
paper (see above, at 3.1.3.). Connected in part to this dispute, the regulations have suffered 
from non-compliance, which further complicates their status under international law.
161
 
Vessels that are required to obtain icebreaker assistance under the ASPPR and AIRSS are 
required to request such services through NORDREG and must also provide an after report to 
NORDREG after such services are obtained and navigation under icebreaker escort is 
conducted. This requirement can be viewed as an attempt by Canada to increase participation 
and compliance with the NORDREG regulations and consequently address their disputed 
status under international law.
162
 However, by connecting ice breaking requirements to 
NORDREG through mandatory reporting requirements, Canada may run the risk of having 
such ice breaking requirements dragged into the ongoing dispute surrounding the NORDREG 
regulations. 
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An important feature of the ice breaking and support services provided by the CCG in the 
NWP is that such services are provided with no fee for the user.
163
 Instead, the costs involved 
with ice breaking in that area are absorbed by the CCG, which is funded by Canadian federal 
government revenue. This is somewhat remarkable when one considers the high cost involved 
in ice breaking operations in remote areas of the Canadian Arctic. It is in contrast to winter ice 
breaking in Southern Canada, where users must pay a substantial fee for ice breaking 
services.
164
 It also serves as a point of comparison between ice breaking in the NWP and ice 
breaking in the NSR. Ships navigating the latter route must obtain a permit which often 
includes mandatory ice breaking as a condition of navigation. Substantial fees are attached to 
mandatory ice breaking services, even if ice breaker assistance may not be necessary in light 
of ice conditions or vessel construction.
165
  
The absence of fees for ice breaking in the NWP has both positive and negative 
implications. Legal issues that fees attract have already been introduced (see above, at 3.1.2.), 
and it is positive that Canada can avoid these issues entirely. Since most of the current 
shipping is of vital importance to remote Canadian Arctic settlements and communities, the 
lack of fees can be viewed as one less obstacle for supporting these communities and 
connecting them to the rest of the nation. Conversely, the absence of fees for ice breaking 
comes at a great expense, not only to the CCG and the other agencies involved, but also 
Canadian tax-payers. In various ways, it seems to make sense that a user should have to bear 
the cost of their activities in the NWP. Such fees could then in turn be used for inter alia 
economic, community and infrastructure development in the Canadian Arctic region. At 
present the question of fees in the NWP is more of a policy issue rather than a legal one, but 
this may change in the future. In a conversation with Stacy Dufour, Icebreaking 
Superintendent with the CCG, the author learned that major changes could be coming in 
relation to fees for ice breaking services in the NWP. Future implementation of fees is 





To assert sovereignty over Arctic waters (and prescribe stringent navigation and ice breaking 
requirements for foreign vessels on the basis of such sovereignty) is one thing, but for Canada 
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to enforce it is quite another. Spatial considerations do not permit a thorough examination of 




As introduced at the outset of this chapter, Transport Canada has regulatory oversight 
over laws and regulations related to Arctic shipping and ice breaking in the NWP (see above, 
at 4.1.). However, aside from some limited powers to issue vessels with monetary penalties, 
without a fleet of vessels, equipment, or other similar resources, Transport Canada relies on 
other agencies to inter alia board and inspect vessels; prevent vessels from navigating in 
prohibited areas; ensure vessels do not continue in areas without icebreaker escort if they are 
required to have such assistance; and otherwise physically enforce laws and regulations in 
relation to ice breaking in the NWP. The Canadian Armed Forces, the RCMP, and the CCG 
share defence and constabulary functions in the Canadian Arctic.
168
 However, only the CCG 
is capable of navigation in most of the Arctic, being the only one agency of the three with ice-
strengthened ships and personnel competently trained in ice navigation.
169
 In light of 
differences between the mandates of the three agencies and the imbalance in their respective 
Arctic navigational capabilities, the CCG is the paramount agency for the enforcement of 
laws and regulations in relation to ice breaking in the NWP. 
The CCG’s ice breaking fleet is currently made up of two “heavy” icebreakers rated 
between AC 3-4.
170
 Four “medium” icebreakers, are only rated AC 2-3 and are therefore may 
have limited ice navigational capabilities in large parts of the Arctic archipelago at any time 
of the year. Nonetheless, CCG personnel maintain these vessels can cope with the current 
volume of traffic in the NWP.
171
 As Lalonde states: 
While Canada does not own any vessel which can navigate the M’Clure Strait in 
January, neither are there any foreign vessels foolhardy enough to attempt a crossing 
at that time of the year. Basically, Canadian Coast Guard vessels are present when 
foreign vessels are interested in navigating the Northwest Passage.
172
 
It should also be noted that any CCG vessel navigating in the Arctic has a pollution 
prevention officer on board, empowered to enforce the AWPPA (under Articles 14-17 of that 
Act).
173
 In the event of an infraction of any of the relevant laws and regulations established 
under the AWPPA by a vessel, such officers have the authority to act in order to prevent or 
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respond to environmental harm.
174
 Most often, foreign vessels, anxious to secure the help of 
the CCG in the often hostile Arctic waters, will comply with any orders or directives from the 
pollution prevention officer on board, including ice breaking measures.
175
 It is in the absence 
of such cooperation (or the absence of CCG vessels altogether) that the situation becomes 
more complicated. 
Global warming can also be expected to complicate the situation. To date, foreign 
compliance has been largely determined by the need for the security provided by the ice 
breaking services of the CCG. As the ice diminishes, chances are that that traffic will increase 
at the same time as the need for Canadian ice breaking services diminishes. Accordingly, 
compliance with Canadian navigation and ice breaking requirements in the NWP is also likely 
to diminish. In fact, there have been various acts of non-compliance in the past. Anecdotal 
evidence from the author’s personal communications with Transport Canada and CCG 
officials suggests that there were some 15 acts of non-compliance during the 2012 summer 
navigation season alone.
176
 These acts included failures to comply with NORDREG reporting 
requirements, navigation in zones where vessels were prohibited from entry, and failure to 
request ice breaker escort when the AIRSS standards deemed such assistance necessary.
177
  
These communications also revealed that the ‘mandatory’ NORDREG regulations are 
still, for all intents and purposes, treated as voluntary in nature by relevant government 
agencies.
178
 Further, the officials with whom the author spoke were very careful to describe 
acts contrary to the requirements under the ASPPR, Zone/Date System, and the AIRRS as ‘not 
in compliance’, rather than ‘illegal’, ‘in violation of…’ or other, similar, more severe terms.
179
 
It seems to the author that Canada has adopted a very conservative approach to enforcement 
of laws, regulations and practices in relation to ice breaking in the NWP. This is likely 
necessary in light of Canada’s limited operational capability in the marine Arctic, its 
precarious legal claims in relation to the area, and the limits imposed by the LOSC.  
The above reality leaves Canada ill-equipped to meet future challenges (ice breaking 
or otherwise) in the NWP. It also supports the continuation of a theme in the Canadian Arctic: 
Canada is not yet prepared for anything but the status quo in the NWP in terms of 
enforcement capabilities; nor is Canada in an adequately secure legal position to willingly 
bring or defend its purported jurisdiction over navigation in the NWP before an international 















court or tribunal. The time has therefore come to decide whether Canada is going to choose to 




5. CHAPTER V – THE CONSISTENCY OF CANADIAN PRACTICE IN RELATION 
TO ICE BREAKING (i.e. LAWS, REGULATIONS, POLICIES, ENFORCEMENT) 
WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW 
5.1. Introduction 
Having provided both an account of relevant aspects of the international legal framework for 
Arctic shipping (Chapter III), and an account of the Canadian practice related to ice breaking 
in the NWP (Chapter IV), an analysis of the consistency of the Canadian practice with the 
international legal framework can now be attempted. However, the author cautions that such 
an analysis is not entirely straightforward. A principal, complicating factor is the multitude of 
different positions on which legal regime under the international law of the sea should be 
applied to the NWP. These positions are summarized and re-stated (from above, at 3.1.2.) as 
follows: 
(a) The waters within the Arctic Archipelago, which includes the NWP, are historic 
internal waters that do not provide for a right of innocent passage and over which 
Canada exercises absolute sovereignty; (The view of Canada) 
(b) The NWP is a strait used for international navigation through which a right of 
transit passage exists; (The view of the US) 
(c) The waters are non-historic internal waters that provide for a right of innocent 
passage; (alternative scenario, should both Canada and the US be unable to make their 
respective cases) 
(d) The waters are part of Canada’s territorial sea or EEZ through which a right of 
innocent passage (territorial sea) or a freedom of navigation (EEZ) exists. (another 
alternative scenario, again arising if both Canada and the US are unable to make their 
respective cases) 
Once again, it is not the intention here to assess or evaluate the merits of these legal positions. 
On the other hand, it is important to note that each of these positions carries with them 
different entitlements to jurisdiction for Canada, the coastal state, in relation to foreign vessels 
navigating in the NWP. Accordingly, an analysis of Canada’s practice in respect of ice 
breaking in the NWP in light of international law can be expected to result in different 
outcomes depending on which legal regime is applied.  
Importantly, Canada itself holds the view that the NWP is a part of its historic internal 
waters. Applying this view, the Canadian practice related to ice breaking may be consistent 
with international law even if it is only consistent with the legal regime for historic internal 
waters. In fact, invoking alternative legal regimes as the basis for such practice could be 
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detrimental to Canada’s overall claim in this regard. Nonetheless, in light of the perceived 
weakness surrounding Canada’s historic internal waters claim (see above, 3.1.2.), to protect 
and preserve its interests in the NWP, Canada would be well advised to consider these 
alternatives. Canada can best position itself by tailoring its practice in relation to icebreaking 
to be consistent with alternative legal regimes, while at the same time maintaining its claim to 
historic internal waters. While this approach should not be expected to improve the merit of 
the Canadian historic internal waters claim, other states may be less inclined to challenge 
Canadian practice that, despite its contested legal basis, is otherwise consistent with the other 
international regimes that may be applicable to the NWP.  
 
5.2. Comparing Canadian practice with the international regimes 
5.2.1. Historic internal waters 
First, of the different positions listed above (at 5.1.), Canada’s jurisdiction over the NWP is 
undoubtedly the least limited if its baselines did enclose waters already considered Canadian 
internal waters (position (a), above at 5.1.). Indeed, because of the relatively broad powers 
available to a state in accordance with full sovereignty, the Canadian practice in relation to ice 
breaking is prima facie consistent with international law. In relation to commercial vessels, 
Canada enjoys full sovereignty and is free to regulate their activity in its internal waters in the 
same way as on its land territory. Consequently, there are very few international rules limiting 
Canada’s jurisdiction over these vessels. 
The regime of historic internal waters in the NWP should be interpreted so as to reflect 
bilateral treaty arrangements.
180
 Relevant here is the bilateral 1988 Arctic Cooperation 
Agreement (see above, at 3.1.2.) between the US and Canada. However, for the purposes of 
this thesis, nothing in this agreement conflicts with or constrains the Canadian practice in 
question. In fact, through the Agreement, in exchange for guaranteed access and transit rights 
for US government vessels, the US makes an express undertaking to comply with Canadian 
practice in relation to ice breaking in the NWP, thus functionally reconciling Canada’s 
historic internal waters claim over the NWP with the US ‘strait used for international 
navigation’ position. The US undertaking to comply with Canadian practice can also be 
viewed as a waiver of foreign state immunity for US vessels in the NWP.  
Foreign state immunity is one of the few exceptions to sovereignty over historic 
internal waters. Foreign state immunity provides visiting warships and foreign government 
ships immunity from the laws of the coastal state, and, in respect of other non-US foreign 
                                                 
180
 Rothwell and Stephens 2010, 55. 
36 
 
state vessels, that are not subject to any special agreement, may constrain Canadian practice in 
the NWP. To the author’s knowledge this issue has not yet arisen. Presently, almost all 
warships and government ships engaged in surface navigation in the NWP are US-flagged, 
and thus have agreed to be bound by the Canadian laws and regulations in question.
181
 Those 
few non-US foreign state vessels that also engage in surface navigation in the NWP have 
mostly complied with Canadian requirements in relation to ice breaking and navigation.
182
 
However, such compliance in this regard may be more easily attributed to practical needs 
rather than recognition of Canadian jurisdiction. The issue of foreign state immunity is 
revisited below (at 5.3.2.). 
 
5.2.2. The LOSC international straits regime 
The US position, that the NWP is an international strait subject to the right of transit passage 
(position (b), above at 5.1.), is certainly the least favourable to Canada in terms of exerting 
stringent and unilateral control over foreign vessels navigating the area. When Canadian 
practice in relation to ice breaking is compared to the jurisdiction of states bordering straits 
normally permitted under the international straits regime in Part III of the LOSC, one finds 
considerable divergence.  
The Canadian requirements (such as the requirement to obtain ice breaker assistance 
to navigate certain zones under the AIRSS, or an outright prohibition on navigation in a 
particular zone under the Zone/Date System) are in excess of any applicable international 
regulations allowed for coastal states under Article 42(1)(a) and (b) of the LOSC. They also 
deny, hamper, impair, or suspend the right of transit passage set out in Articles 42(2) and 44.  
An argument could be made that leading a vessel through the NWP by icebreaker 
escort might be similar to sea lanes or traffic schemes permitted under Article 41, but 
according to that provision such measures must be adopted through the IMO, and not 
unilaterally established.
183
 Similarly, the unilaterally established NORDREG reporting 
requirements associated with the ice breaking requirements may also be argued as 
inapplicable to transit passage through international straits as set out in Part III of the LOSC. 
Application of Canadian laws to state vessels may also be inconsistent with the LOSC.
184
 
Finally, while Canada does not appear to actively exercise its enforcement jurisdiction, the 
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enforcement measures provided for under the laws and regulations in relation to ice breaking 
in the NWP are arguably contrary to those sanctioned under Article 233 of the LOSC. 
While based on the above it would appear that Canadian practice in relation to ice 
breaking is largely inconsistent with the international straits regime of the LOSC, some points 
should be considered. First, at present, the international straits regime does not seem to apply 
to the NWP.
185
 Second, the LOSC confers on Canada important rights and privileges by virtue 
of Article 234, although there are significant interpretational uncertainties related to the 
provision’s application to the international straits regime (see above, at 3.1.3.). If Canadian 
practice in relation to ice breaking in the NWP is a valid exercise of Article 234 (see below, at 
5.3), such practice may be consistent with international law, even if the international straits 
regime is deemed to apply to the area. 
 
5.2.3 The LOSC Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) regime 
The Canadian-US legal positions are not an either/or situation. Both states could be unable to 
make their cases. In such a scenario, one alternative is that the NWP within 12 nautical miles 
of Canadian land territory would become a part of the territorial sea, and areas of the NWP 
further than 12 nautical miles from Canadian land territory would become EEZ (position (d), 
above at 5.1.).
186
 There are no areas of the NWP further than 200 nautical miles from 
Canadian land territory, so no high seas areas would exist. Accordingly, either the territorial 
sea regime or the EEZ regime (both under the LOSC) would apply to those areas. The EEZ 
regime (to be discussed in this section) tolerates lesser coastal state jurisdiction than would be 
allowed under the territorial sea regime (see below, at 5.3.3.). However, both the territorial 
sea and the EEZ regimes tolerate greater coastal state jurisdiction than would be allowed than 
under the international straits regime. 
The prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction of the Articles 211 and 218-220 of the 
LOSC, which relate to environmental measures in the EEZ, are generally infringed by the 
Canadian practice in relation to icebreaking in the NWP. The freedom of navigation provided 
to foreign ships by Article 58(2) is also infringed. Such infringement may also be viewed as a 
failure by Canada to honour its obligation to have due regard to the rights of other states 
provided by Article 56(2).  
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The Canadian laws and regulations may fail to conform to GAIRAS as required under 
the LOSC.
187
 CDEM standards must meet GAIRAS and should not be unilaterally prescribed. 
Here, it is relevant to note the inconsistency between the vessel classes used in the ASPPR’s 
operation and the IACS UR’s for Polar Class ships. Although the Canadian policy is to 
recognise the URs, they are not reflected in the actual laws and regulations itself. Sovereign 
immunity remains protected in the EEZ regime, and application of Canadian laws to state 
vessels may be inconsistent with LOSC.
188
 Finally, it can be argued that the various 
navigation and ice breaking requirements should be processed through the auspices of the 
IMO under Article 211(1), rather than imposed unilaterally. 
Based on this brief analysis, one can see that significant inconsistency with 
international law may arise if the EEZ regime were to be applied to Canadian practice in 
relation to ice breaking in the NWP. Once again, however, the effect of Article 234 has not 
been considered. The powers granted by that special provision may have the effect of bringing 
the Canadian practice in line with international law under the EEZ regime. Article 234 is 
considered below (at 5.3). 
 
5.2.4. The LOSC territorial sea regime (and non-historic internal waters providing a right of 
innocent passage) 
In the scenario where areas of the NWP are part of Canada’s territorial sea (position (d), 
above at 5.1.), a right of innocent passage exists for foreign vessels. However, a similar right 
may arise in another scenario. If both Canada and the US were unable to make their respective 
cases, the NWP could alternatively be deemed part of Canada’s non-historic internal waters 
where a right of innocent passage exists.
189
 In both scenarios, the right of innocent passage is 
governed by Section 3, Part II of the LOSC. 
When compared to the international straits and EEZ regimes, greater coastal state 
jurisdiction is allowed under Article 25(1) of the LOSC, in order to prevent non-innocent 
passage in the territorial sea. Under Article 21, provisions for navigational safety and 
environmental protection may be adopted by the coastal state and would arguably enjoy more 
than usual application in ice-covered waters. However, aspects of the Canadian practice may 
suspend or hamper innocent passage as it is understood by Articles 19 and 24(1). Though 
states may take preventative and exclusionary measures pursuant to Article 25 of the LOSC to 
prevent passage prejudicial to their peace, good order, or security, this is to be on a case-by-
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case basis and is not to be a universal policy. Article 25(3) allows for temporary suspension of 
passage for reasons of security in specified areas, but not for definite closure. For these 
reasons, it is unclear whether Article 25 would be compatible with the restrictions on 
navigation arising from Section 6(4) of the ASPPR, the Zone/Date System, and the AIRSS. 
Again, the safety standards and CDEM standards must be GAIRAS adopted through 
IMO conventions ratified by states representing a high percentage of the world’s gross 
tonnage. In contrast, the ‘established norms’ applied by Canada here are vessel construction 
standards established by Transport Canada.  
Ice breaker escort and assistance may be justified for reasons of navigational and 
vessel safety in ice-covered waters pursuant to Article 21 of the LOSC. The parallel between 
icebreaker assistance and sea lanes may be stronger in the territorial sea, as Article 22 of the 
LOSC merely requires a state to “take into account” IMO recommendations. However, 
coastal states can only exercise powers under Article 22 ‘where necessary for the safety of 
navigation’. The Canadian blanket requirement for ice breaker assistance arising from Section 
6(4) ASPPR, on the other hand, may arguably apply when it is not needed, such as during ice-
free summers. 
The various Canadian enforcement measures including inspection, arrest, detention, 
suspension, removal, and other proceedings (even though they are rarely invoked), are in 
excess of international rules regarding innocent passage unless carried out in ports, the 
measures are taken against a vessel that is proceeding from internal waters, or the order of the 
state is threatened.
190
 When acts of willful and serious pollution occur, under Article 19(2)(h) 
of the LOSC more stringent enforcement measures are clearly applicable, but on a case-by-
case basis only. Finally, sovereign immunity remains protected in the territorial sea regime, 
and application of Canadian laws to state vessels may be inconsistent with LOSC.
191
 
It appears that Canadian practice in relation to ice breaking in the NWP is also 
inconsistent with the innocent passage regime of the LOSC, albeit less inconsistent here than 
under the two previous regimes explored in this paper. Moreover, such findings indicate that, 
unless the historic internal waters regime is applied, the present Canadian practice in relation 
to ice breaking in the NWP is generally inconsistent with the coastal state powers normally 
granted under international law. However, once again, the findings above do not take into 
account the special powers granted to coastal states over ice-covered area by Article 234 of 
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the LOSC – which adds a significant dimension to the regulation of international shipping in 
the NWP. 
 
5.3 An assessment of Canadian practice in light of Article 234 
5.3.1. Introduction 
Article 234 of the LOSC was introduced earlier in this paper (see above, at 3.1.3.). For present 
purposes, it is important to recall that the basic purpose of the provision is to provide a coastal 
state with broader prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction in ice-covered areas than in 
maritime zones elsewhere (with the exception of historic internal waters, where coastal state 
jurisdiction is the least limited).
192
 If maintaining its claim to historic internal waters, Canada 
should not invoke Article 234, as such an approach could be detrimental to its claim of full 
sovereignty. Despite the fact that the Canadian practice in relation to ice breaking involves 
more stringent standards than GAIRAS and envisions a limited role for the IMO in the 
regulation of shipping in the NWP, it may be at any rate consistent with international law if 
viewed as a valid exercise of jurisdiction under Article 234. As the ambiguous wording of 
Article 234 indicates, however, such jurisdiction is subject to several restrictions and can only 
be exercised for specified purposes.  
Pursuant to the discussion earlier in this paper (see above, at 3.1.3.), for the most part, 
the Canadian practice in relation to ice breaking in the NWP may be considered consistent 
with the environmental protection purpose of Article 234 and well within the limits of the 
jurisdiction granted by the provision. However, there are several aspects of the Canadian 
practice which may remain inconsistent with international law even in light of Article 234 
 
5.3.2. Foreign state immunity: the relationship between Article 234 and Article 236 
Generally, each state must regulate vessels flying its own flag in accordance with the principle 
of flag state jurisdiction.
193
 Yet, the particular appeal of Article 234 for Canada is to allow the 
coastal state to enact laws and regulations applying to foreign vessels in a given area of the 
NWP. However, Article 236, which forms Section 10 of Part XII, grants sovereign immunity 
to state vessels with respect to all provisions of the LOSC relating to the protection and 
preservation of the marine environment, including Article 234.
194
 The sovereign immunity of 
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flag states for their state vessels is a common feature in the LOSC.
195
 It corresponds to a 
recurring request of the user states and was part of the Article 234 negotiations.
196
 
 The application of Canada’s laws and regulations in relation to ice breaking in the 
NWP are based on vessel size/weight, cargo, and construction (see above, at 4.3.). These 
criteria do not distinguish between state and non-state vessels. Consequently, state vessels 
falling within the relevant size/weight, cargo or construction criteria would be subject to these 
Canadian laws and regulations. This is inconsistent with all of the legal regimes that may be 
applicable to the NWP, historic internal waters included.  
Further, the universal application of Canadian laws and regulations in this regard is 
likely unwarranted. Compared to the commercial fleet, the world’s fleet of state vessels is 
relatively insignificant and the seaworthiness of state vessels is often less problematic than 
that of commercial ships.
197
 In addition, state vessels generally do not have hazardous goods 
aboard, except for fuel or nuclear elements for their propulsion systems.
198
 Moreover, Article 




In light of this discussion on the relationship of Articles 234 and 236, the former 
article does not provide an adequate basis for the application of Canadian laws and 
regulations to state vessels enjoying sovereign immunity. As such, the application of laws and 
regulations in relation to ice breaking in the NWP to foreign state vessels can be viewed as 
inconsistent with international law even in light of Article 234. 
 
5.3.3. Necessity of scientific evidence  
Another restriction on the powers of the coastal state is the necessity, set out in Article 234, to 
ensure that measures prescribed for the protection and preservation of the marine environment 
are based on the best available evidence (see above, at 3.1.3.). This reference is intended to 
guard against arbitrary restrictions on international navigation since the coastal state must be 
able to establish that its measures have a scientific justification.
200
 Scientific evidence, for 
example, has to confirm the adequacy between adopted measures and the need for protection 
or compliance with the ice-covered condition. 










 LOSC, Article 236 
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 The scientific basis of certain aspects of current Canadian practice in relation to ice 
breaking in the NWP has been questioned earlier in this paper (see above, at 4.4.1, 4.4.2, and 
4.4.3, in relation to Section 6(4) of the ASPPR, the Zone/Date System, and the AIRRS, 
respectively). The most striking example is the Zone/Date System, which has been found to 
allow vessels into ice regimes which have a high potential to damage the vessel in some 
instances, and in others, often restrict vessels from entering regions where the ice conditions 
are favourable for a safe passage. The large annual variations in ice are not taken into account 
by this system - it has fixed (rigid) entry dates that often do not reflect the severity of the ice. 
Although more concrete scientific evidence for restrictions on navigation can be produced 
through the AIRSS’ arithmetic calculations, the veracity of this system has also been 
questioned. 
 20 years ago, this may not have been the case for Canada, but the effects of climate 
change have altered the accuracy of the Canadian ice breaking regime. It is not enough for 
Canadian practice to have a scientific basis fixed in time. As science is in constant evolution, 
adjustment seems to be inherent to Article 234.
201
 Canada should ensure that its legislation 
keeps pace with new scientific developments – changing distribution and understanding of sea 
ice included. The scientific inaccuracy of the Canadian practice in relation to ice breaking in 
the NWP may not be significant enough to have fatal effects on its status under international 
law. However, in light of the necessity of scientific evidence under Article 234, in future, as 
long as Canada’s ice breaking regime remains scientifically flawed, its stringent restrictions 
on navigation in the NWP may be inconsistent with international law. 
 
5.3.4. Indirect discrimination 
The last potential area of inconsistency between Canadian practice and international law to be 
mentioned in this paper relates to the requirement of non-discrimination among and against 
states. This requirement has been introduced earlier in this paper (see above, at 3.1.3.) but to 
re-iterate, Article 234 gives the coastal state the “right to adopt and enforce non-
discriminatory laws and regulations.” Article 234 is found in Part XII of the LOSC, related to 
protection and preservation of the marine environment. Another provision, Article 227, is 
found in the same Part, and is important for the understanding of the non-discrimination 
requirement in Article 234 as it generally prohibits any discrimination by measures taken 
under Part XII. Bartenstein argues that “given the minimal wording [on the meaning of ‘non-
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discriminatory’] in Article 234, it is advisable to resort to Article 227 to inform this aspect of 
the interpretation of Article 234.”
202
 
 Article 227 explicitly prohibits discrimination “in form or in fact.” The wording in 
Article 234, read together with Article 227, embraces two forms of discrimination - direct or 
indirect.
203
 Direct or formal discrimination would clearly identify the more or less favourably 
treated states.
204
 Indirect or factual discrimination, on the contrary, is not visible from the 
outset, but becomes apparent by the application of rules affecting some of the foreign fleets 
more adversely than others.
205
 
Currently, the Canadian ice breaking regulations and standards incorporate a mix of 
unique Canadian Arctic Categories (AC & CAC), and Types vessel classes in their operation 
(see above, at 4.5.2.). Vessels designed to any other ice class are only considered for 
equivalency on a case-by-case basis. These regulations and standards could discriminate in 
fact against foreign fleets that do not have any vessels qualifying as equivalent to the 
Canadian classes where others do.
206
 If such discrimination is the consequence of the 
prescription based solely on reasons related to the prevention, reduction, and control of 
marine pollution and without any considerations related to the nationality of the vessels, then 
the indirect discrimination is arguably justified.
207
 Yet, if an indirectly discriminating measure 
were challenged by a state suggesting violation of the non-discrimination rule, Canada bears 
the burden of showing that the discrimination is a non-intended side effect.
208
 
Canada could perhaps avoid this issue altogether by modifying its laws and regulations 
to adopt the prescriptions relating to a ship’s hull found in the IACS URs for Polar Class 
ships or the IMO Guidelines for Polar Shipping. These standards were developed within the 
auspices of the IMO (or with its support) and they can accordingly be viewed as multilateral 
action which enjoys the support of the competent international organization in this regard. 
Such standards could be viewed as GAIRAS, rather than unilateral measures adopted by 
Canada. As such, Canada could spare itself from the burden of showing that any 
discrimination is a non-intended side effect of otherwise valid measures related to the 
prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution. However, as the URs and Guidelines 
for Polar Shipping are only voluntary, Canada might consider it worthwhile to wait until it 

















can modify its laws and regulations upon to reflect the forthcoming Polar Code, which will 
contain mandatory construction standards for ships operating in polar regions. 
 
5.4. Summary 
Prima facie, Canadian practice in relation to ice breaking in the NWP is consistent with 
international law if the historic internal waters claim, held by Canada, prevails. As Canada 
enjoys full sovereignty over such waters, the extent of its jurisdiction over foreign ships 
navigating the NWP is virtually unlimited. Consistency does not necessarily equate to a valid 
historic internal waters claim, and as discussed, Canada should exercise caution in prescribing 
and enforcing laws and regulations in relation to navigational restrictions for foreign ships if it 
does not wish to expose its claim to challenge. 
 Applying any other legal regime, be it innocent passage, freedom of navigation, or 
transit passage, the navigational restrictions arising from the Canadian practice in relation to 
ice breaking in the NWP are generally inconsistent with international law. The stringent, 
unilateral measures go beyond that permitted under those regimes, and unduly deny, hamper, 
impair, or suspend the navigational rights and freedoms protected under the LOSC.  
Despite this conclusion, the special powers to take broader prescriptive and 
enforcement measures under Article 234 may be enough to bring the Canadian practice in 
conformity with international law. The requirements for jurisdiction under that Article are 
generally fulfilled, but a conclusive determination depends on the precise limit of many of its 
vague, ambiguous terms. For example, the scientific inaccuracy of the Canadian ice breaking 
regimes may not fulfill the ‘necessity of scientific evidence’ requirement, and the 
incorporation of unilateral vessel construction standards in those regimes may also fail to 
meet the ‘non-discrimination’ requirement.  
 Across all regimes, historic internal waters included, the application of Canadian laws 
and regulations to foreign state vessels, that traditionally enjoy sovereign immunity, is 
inconsistent with international law. In light of Article 236, not even Article 234 can reconcile 
this aspect of the Canadian practice with international law. However, within historic internal 
waters, it may not be so definitive. Nonetheless, to avoid challenge, Canada would be advised 
to exclude such vessels from its jurisdiction over the NWP. As these vessels make up a small 
proportion of the vessels potentially operating within the NWP and generally pose few risks 





6. CHAPTER VI – CONCLUSION 
6.1. Conclusions 
 The main objective of this paper was to assess the extent to which the Canadian laws, 
regulations and practices in relation to ice breaking in the NWP are consistent with 
international law. The author admits with full disclosure that the findings in relation to this 
assessment are far from definitive. This outcome is reflective of the overall nature of the 
NWP, which has mystified explorers, mariners and legal scholars alike for as long as man has 
contemplated its existence. It is possible to arrive at a different determination depending on 
which of the many existing one takes in relation to the NWP’s legal status. Add to this the 
many interpretational uncertainties surrounding Article 234 and the powers of coastal states to 
exercise special jurisdiction in ice-covered areas, and the conclusion is even more 
unpredictable. 
 The findings in the previous chapter suggest that the Canadian practice is more or less 
consistent with the historic internal waters regime, which, at any rate, is the regime currently 
held by Canada to apply to the NWP. Apply any other regime and the outcome becomes less 
conclusive. However, one final note should be made: even if it was concluded that the 
Canadian practice was wildly inconsistent with international law, it is unlikely a challenge to 
such practice would arise if Canada did not seek to enforce compliance with its prescriptive 
jurisdiction. As this paper noted (see above, at 4.6), this lackadaisical approach seems to be 
the contemporary policy and practice in the NWP. While such an approach may satisfy 
Canadian political objectives by keeping their ’creeping jurisdiction’ over the NWP 
unscathed, one must question whether it adequately addresses the other challenges 
confronting the area, notably those of climate change and marine environmental security. 
 Climate change has impacted the Canadian marine Arctic significantly. Canadian 
practice may have been ahead of its time in the 1970s when the AWPPA was adopted, but the 
ASPPR, Zone/Date System, and the AIRSS implemented under that legislation may no longer 
sufficiently address the risks posed to the marine environment. Arctic sea ice has changed but 
the systems designed to regulate ice navigation have not. It is insufficient for these systems to 
remain static and expect them to achieve the objectives they were designed for. Canada 
should ensure that its practice keeps up with the needs of the Arctic environment. At the same 
time, if Canada seeks to develop Arctic shipping in the region, it cannot place undue 
restrictions on vessels seeking to operate there. 
46 
 
 Further, it is worth questioning whether a unilateral approach, even one consistent 
with international law, is superior to a multilateral approach. There are many stakeholders in 
the Arctic, and the nature of shipping itself is international. Accordingly, unilateral standards 
and measures, such as the vessel construction standards currently incorporated in the 
Canadian ice breaking regime, may be inadequate to address the issues associated with 
increased shipping in the NWP. Although there is always a risk that multilateral negotiations 
may result in sub-par standards, there seems to be sufficient interest and willingness in the 
international community to take a proactive approach to those problems currently confronting 
the Arctic. This is made evident by the multitude of instruments emerging from the auspices 
of the IMO and the ACS. 
 Spatial considerations did not permit an examination of the topic, but the possible 
emergence of customary international law related to ice breaking in trans-Arctic routes, the 
regulation of Arctic shipping, and the interpretation of Article 234 is worth further 
investigation. The practice of Canada in relation to ice breaking in the NWP is remarkably 
similar to that of the Russian Federation in relation to ice breaking in the NSR. It could be 
beneficial for both states to attempt to coordinate and harmonise their practices so as to 
protect common interests and positions. 
 In closing, credit should be given to Canada and its practice in relation to ice breaking 
in the NWP. Much of this practice can be viewed as an innovative and progressive 
development of the modern law of the sea in relation to the protection and preservation of the 
sensitive and unique Arctic environment. Any fault that has been found in the system is to be 
expected as a natural consequence of taking a bold and precautionary approach to 
environmental issues before they materialize. The way forward, however, is to take a critical 
perspective of the weaknesses of the Canadian practice. Too much of it is aimed at 
maintaining precarious claims. As an environmental steward, Canada must focus on the needs 
of the vessel, the seafarer and the environment rather than pursuing or advocating politically 
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Annex 1 – Water Routes of the Northwest Passage 
Route Routing (East to 
West) 
Physical Description Of Note 
1 Lancaster Sound – Barrow 
Strait – Viscount Melville 
Sound – Prince of Wales 
Strait – Amundsen Gulf. 
Lancaster Sound: 80 km wide, 250 km long, deep 
at over 500 m. 
Barrow Strait: 50 km wide, 180 km long, deep, 
string of islands west of Resolute disrupts clear 
navigation. 
Viscount Melville Sound: 100 km wide, 350 km 
long, experiences multi-year ice from M’Clure Strait. 
Prince of Wales Strait: minimum width of less than 
10 km about half way through the Strait, 230 
km long, limiting depth of 32 m. 
Amundsen Gulf: irregular shape, 90 km wide 
entrance, approximately 300 km long. 
Suitable for deep draft 
navigation; the route 
followed by St. Roch in 
1944 on westerly 
transit and the SS 
Manhattan in 1969. 
2 Same as 1 but substitute 
M’Clure Strait for Prince of 
Wales Strait and Amundsen 
Gulf. 
 
Collectively Lancaster Sound 
– Barrow Strait – Viscount 
Melville Sound is known as 
Parry Channel. 
M’Clure Strait: 120 km wide at east end, 275 km 
long to Beaufort Sea, deep at over 400 m, 
experiences 
multi-year ice from Arctic Ocean. 
SS Manhattan attempted 
this route in 1969 




in a passage in 2001. 
In September 2007 was 
clear of Arctic pack 
ice for a limited time since 
satellite photos 
have been available; there 
was more ice 
in 2008. 
3A Lancaster Sound – Barrow 
Strait – Peel Sound 
– Franklin Strait – Larsen 
Sound – Victoria Strait – 
Queen Maud Gulf – Dease 
Strait – Coronation Gulf 
– Dolphin and Union Strait – 
Amundsen Gulf. 
Lancaster Sound and Barrow Strait: see Route 1. 
Peel Sound: 25 km wide, deep at over 400 m at 
south end. 
Franklin Strait: 30 km wide. 
Larsen Sound: depths vary between 30 and 200 
meters. 
Victoria Strait: 120 km wide, at southern end is 
blocked by Royal Geographical Society Islands, 
worst ice conditions along the mainland coast of 
Canada. 
Queen Maud Gulf: eastern entrance 14 km wide, 
but widens into an irregular area with width of 
up to 280 km before narrowing to 14 km at entrance 
to Dease Strait; numerous islands, reefsandshoals. 
Dease Strait: 14 – 60 km wide, 160 km long. 
Coronation Gulf: over 160 km long, many islands. 
Dolphin and Union Strait: 80 km wide at 
Amundsen Gulf, 150 km long, caution should be 
exercised in passage, several soundings of less than 
10 m have been recorded. 
Amundsen Gulf: see Route 1. 
Of the 3A, 3B and 4 
routes, this is considered 
the best option but with a 
draft limit of 
10 m. 
3B A variation of 3A. Rather than 
following Victoria 
Strait on the west side of King 
William Island, the 
route passes to the east of 
the island following 
James Ross Strait – Rae 
Strait – Simpson Strait. 
James Ross Strait: 50 km wide, but restricted by 
islands, extensive shoaling. 
Rae Strait: 20 km wide, with limiting depths of 
between 5-18 m in mid channel. 
Simpson Strait: about 3 km wide at narrowest point, 
most hazardous navigation area in 3B route. 
The route of Roald 
Amundsen. 
Also route of the MS 
Explorer, in 1984, the 
first cruise ship to navigate 
the Northwest 
Passage. 
4 Similar to 3A. Rather than 
following Peel Sound on 
the west side of Somerset 
Island, the route passes 
to the east of the island 
through Prince Regent Inlet 
and Bellot Strait. 
Prince Regent Inlet: 80 km wide, free of islands, 
deep. 
Bellot Strait: short and very narrow, strong currents, 
limiting depth of 22 m. 
Route of St. Roch in 1940-
42 on easterly 
transit. 
 
5 Hudson Strait – Foxe 
Channel – Foxe Basin – Fury 
and Hecla Strait – Gulf of 
Boothia – Bellot Strait – 
remainder via routes 3A, 3B 
or 4. 
Hudson Strait: 100 km wide, 650 km long, deep, 
also serves as entrance to Hudson Bay and 
Churchill port. 
Foxe Channel: 130 km wide, deep, with limiting 
shoal in the middle that can be avoided. 
Foxe Basin: very large, many islands in northern 
end. 
Fury and Hecla Strait: 160 km long, very narrow 
with fast current. 
Gulf of Boothia: very large waterway connecting to 
Prince Regent Inlet to the north (see route 
4). No problems for navigation except at exit of Fury 
and Hecla Strait where Crown Prince Frederick 
Island is to be avoided. 
Not generally considered a 
viable commercial 





Annex 2 - Polar Class General Description 
PC 1 Year-round operation in all Polar waters 
PC 2 Year-round operation in moderate multi-year ice conditions 
PC 3 Year-round operation in second-year ice which may include multi-year ice inclusions 
PC 4 Year-round operation in thick first-year ice which may include old ice inclusions 
PC 5 Year-round operation in medium first-year ice which may include old ice inclusions 
PC 6 Summer/autumn operation in medium first-year ice which may include old ice 
inclusions 



















Annex 3 – Map of the Shipping Safety Control Zones 
 
 
